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Wilder v. Amatex Corp.: A First Step Toward Ameliorating the
Effect of Statutes of Repose on Plaintiffs with Delayed
Manifestation Diseases
Statutes of repose have emerged in recent years as a controversial method of
limiting manufacturers' liability for injuries caused by their products.' These
statutes limit the time period within which plaintiffs may bring actions based on
defects in products and thus often lead to harsh results when the manifestation
of the product's effect is delayed. Nevertheless, in Barwick v. Celotex Corp.,2 an
asbestosis case,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit up-
held a North Carolina statute of repose against constitutional attack and held
that the plaintiff was barred from recovery.4 Although other jurisdictions have
found similar statutes unconstitutional, 5 the federal court of appeals predicted
that the North Carolina Supreme Court would find that the statute did not vio-
late the North Carolina or United States Constitutions.6 A year later, the North
Carolina Supreme Court had the opportunity to determine the statute's constitu-
tionality in another asbestosis case, Wilder v. Amatex Corp.7 In contrast to the
federal court of appeals, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the stat-
ute of repose did not bar the plaintiff's recovery.8 However, the supreme court
avoided the constitutional issues reached by the federal court of appeals by hold-
1. See McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of
Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 579 (1981).
2. 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984).
3. "Asbestosis" refers to fibrosis of the lungs caused by asbestos dust. The disease, character-
ized by breathlessness, progresses long after exposure to asbestos ceases. There is no known treat-
ment to stop the progression of the disease. W. PARKES, OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISORDERS 255,
267-73 (2d ed. 1982). For a general discussion of the history and social implications of asbestos
litigation, see Brodeur, Annals of Law: The Asbestos Industry on Trial (pts. I-IV), NEW YORKER,
June 10, 1985, at 49; June 17, 1985, at 45; June 24, 1985, at 37; July 1, 1985, at 36.
4. For a description of statutes of repose, see infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 155-170 and accompanying text.
6. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 948-49. A federal court must apply the law of the state in which it is
sitting unless the case is governed by the United States Constitution or acts of Congress. Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In determining what the law of a state is the federal court
generally must rely on the decisions of the state's highest court. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 58 (4th ed. 1983). If that court has not yet decided the issue,
however, the federal court may "consider all the data the highest court of the state would use in an
effort to determine how the highest court of the state would decide." Id. § 58, at 373. The decision
of the state supreme court prevails if it construes the statute differently from the federal courts.
Nature Conservancy v. Machipongo Club, Inc., 579 F.2d 873, 875 (4th Cir. 1978).
7. No. 239PA84 (N.C. Nov. 5, 1985). Wilder arose out of the Orange County Superior Court.
While the case was pending before the North Carolina Court of Appeals, a petition for discretionary
review was filed pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1981 & Supp. 1985). The North Carolina
Supreme Court granted the petition for review prior to the court of appeals' determination on the
merits. Petition for Discretionary Review Under G.S. 7A-31 (filed May 11, 1984; allowed July 6,
1984). Defendants based the petition for discretionary review on the arguments that most asbestosis
cases were being filed in the federal district courts, id. at 5, and that the federal courts were having to
predict whether the state courts would find statutes of repose constitutional as applied to delayed
manifestation diseases. Id. at 8. Plaintiff joined in the petition for the same reasons. Id. at 11.
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Wilder never addressed the constitutional
issues raised in the petition.
8. Wilder, slip op. at 3.
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ing that the general assembly could not have intended the statute to apply to
delayed manifestation diseases such as asbestosis. 9
The statute at issue in Barwick and Wilder was repealed in 1979 and re-
placed by two similar statutes.10 Because the supreme court did not rule on
these statutes, it is unclear whether delayed manifestation disease plaintiffs
whose claims are governed by the new statutes will be barred by the statutes'
repose provisions. Thus, although Wilder assures that plaintiffs in North Caro-
lina with delayed manifestation diseases who filed claims before October 1,
1979,11 will not be barred from recovery by the applicable statute of repose,
plaintiffs with more recent claims may be left without a remedy. 12 Wilder indi-
cates the public policy of the State that such plaintiffs should not be barred by
statutes of repose. It is also possible that such statutes are unconstitutional
when applied to plaintiffs with delayed manifestation diseases. lis Note ana-
lyzes the decision of the supreme court in Wilder and finds that although the
court reached a commendable conclusion, it used questionable reasoning in
reaching that conclusion. The Note then discusses the holding of the Fourth
Circuit in Barwick and concludes that although a significant body of law sup-
ports the conclusion that statutes of repose are unconstitutional, the Barwick
court's prediction that the North Carolina Supreme Court would uphold such
statutes is probably correct. To avoid the application of the current statutes to
plaintiffs with delayed manifestation diseases, therefore, the general assembly
should amend the current statutes to make it clear that their repose provisions
do not apply to claims based on delayed manifestation diseases such as
asbestosis.
Statutes of repose cut off manufacturers' potential liability for harm caused
by their products after a certain amount of time has elapsed. Thus, a statute of
repose may serve "as a 'cap' on the discovery rule"13-for example, a statute
might provide that a plaintiff must bring suit within three years of discovering
injury, but in no event after ten years from the date of the last wrongful act of
the defendant. The statute runs independently of injury to the plaintiff and
places an absolute limit on the period within which the plaintiff can bring a
products liability action. 14 Unlike statutes of limitations, statutes of repose de-
fine a substantive right.'
5
9. Id. In addition to victims of asbestosis, plaintiffs with other delayed manifestation diseases
such as silicosis and byssinosis may be affected by North Carolina's statutes of repose. The injurious
effect of certain drugs such as DES also is delayed, thus further increasing the number of plaintiffs
who potentially may be affected by statutes of repose. See Wilder, slip op. at 2 (Meyer, J., dissenting)
(listing types of delayed manifestation cases).
10. See infra note 23.
11. The effective date of the new statutes was October 1, 1979.
12. See infra note 200.
13. Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos
Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REv. 573, 652 (1983).
14. Id.
15. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated: "'The statute [of repose]. . . acquires
its substantive quality by barring a right of action even before injury has occurred if the injury occurs
subsequent to the prescribed time period."' Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 427, 302
S.E.2d 868, 872 (1983) (quoting Smith v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 38 N.C.
1986]
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Two North Carolina statutes of repose apply in the products liability con-
text. 16 North Carolina General Statutes section 1-50(6) bars actions brought
more than six years after the initial purchase of a product for use or consump-
tion.17 Under section 1-52(16), causes of action for personal injury or damage to
property accrue when the harm becomes apparent or reasonably should have
become apparent.' 8 However, the section provides that no cause of action may
accrue more than ten years after the last wrongful act of the defendant, regard-
less of when the injury is discovered.1
The statute of repose in effect at the time of Wilder and Barwick, North
Carolina General Statutes section 1-15(b), 20 was similar to section 1-52(16) in
that it served a dual purpose. It contained both a ten-year repose provision and
a "discovery" provision. Thus the statute provided that a cause of action would
not accrue until a claimant either discovered or reasonably should have discov-
ered his or her injury, but established an absolute limitation of ten years from
the last wrongful act of the defendant. The effect of the statute was the same as
that of the current statutes: if an injury was not discovered within a certain
period of time, the injured party's claim was barred.
In Wilder, plaintiff J.W. Wilder's forecast of evidence indicated that he had
worked as an insulator from 1938 until 1979 and had been exposed to defend-
ants' products containing asbestos throughout that period.2 1 Although he began
experiencing shortness of breath in the late 1960s, his condition was not diag-
nosed as asbestosis until 1979 when he underwent a biopsy. He filed suit against
manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products in 1981.22
Defendants argued that the statute of repose barred plaintiff's claims,23 pre-
App. 457, 461, 248 S.E.2d 462, 465 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 586, 254 S.E.2d 33 (1979),
overruled on other grounds, Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 581, 291 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1982)).
16. See infra note 23.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (1983) (text quoted infra at note 23).
18. Id. § 1-52(16) (text quoted infra at note 23).
19. Id. § 1-52(16) (text quoted infra at note 23).
20. Act of July 21, 1971, ch. 1157, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1706, 1706 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-15(b)), repealed by Act of May 28, 1979, ch. 654, § 3a, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687, 689.
See infra note 23 for text of the statute.
21. Wilder, slip op. at 4.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2. The applicable statute was N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b), which read:
Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action, other than one for wrongful
death, having as an essential element bodily injury to the person or a defect in or damage to
property which originated under circumstances making the injury, defect or damage not
readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin, is deemed to have accrued at the
time the injury was discovered by the claimant, or ought reasonably to have been discov-
ered by him, whichever event first occurs; provided that in such cases the period shall not
exceed 10 years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief
Act of July 21, 1971, ch. 1157, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1706, 1706 (emphasis added). This statute
was repealed in 1979, Act of May 28, 1979, ch. 654, § 3a, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687, 689, when the
general assembly enacted the Product Liability Act. Section 1-15(b) was partly recodified as N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (1983), which contains a ten-year repose provision for actions for personal
injury or damage to property. Section 1-52(16) provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, for personal injury or physical damage to claimant's
property, the cause of action, except in causes of actions referred to in G.S. 1-15(c) [causes
of action for malpractice arising out of performance or nonperformance of professional
[Vol. 64
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sumably because plaintiff could not show exposure to particular asbestos-con-
taining products during the ten-year period prior to his diagnosis. 24 The trial
court granted summary judgment for defendants, relying on section 1-15(b), the
statute of repose in effect at the time of plaintiff's diagnosis. 25
The North Carolina Supreme Court26 reversed the trial court's decision
and held that section 1-15(b) did not bar plaintiff's claim 27 because the statute
did not apply to claims arising out of disease.28 The supreme court reasoned
that the general assembly's purpose in enacting section 1-15(b) was to adopt the
"discovery rule" for the accrual of a cause of action.29 Prior to the adoption of
services], shall not accrue until bodily harm to the claimant or physical damage to his
property becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the claimant,
whichever event first occurs. Provided that no cause of action shall accrue more than 10
years from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.
In addition, the general assembly enacted N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (1983), which contains a six-
year period of repose for products liability actions. Section 1-50(6) provides:
No action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to property
based upon or arising out of any alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product shall
be brought more than six years after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption.
24. If plaintiff were able to show exposure to defendants' asbestos-containing products within
the ten-year period preceding commencement of his action, his claim would not be barred by N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) because it would have been brought within 10 years of the last wrongful act of
the defendant.
25. Wilder, slip op. at 2-3. For the language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b), see supra note 23.
The trial court also granted summary judgment for defendant Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corpora-
tion on the ground that plaintiff's forecast of evidence did not show exposure to products manufac-
tured, sold, or distributed by Owens-Coming. Wilder, slip op at 3. The supreme court reversed
summary judgment for Owens-Coming, stating that there was no reason to believe plaintiff would
not be able to show exposure to Owens-Coming's products. Id.
26. See supra note 7 for a description of how Wilder reached the supreme court.
27. Wilder, slip op. at 3. See supra note 25 for a description of the other ground on which the
supreme court reversed the trial court.
28. Wilder, slip op. at 7.
29. Id. at 9. The court cited Raftery v. Win. C. Vick Constr. Co., 291 N.C. 180, 230 S.E.2d 405
(1976). In Raftery plaintiff's intestate was injured by a defective crane manufactured by defendant
more than 10 years earlier. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that plaintiff's wrongful death
action was not barred by § 1-15(b) because the statute applied only to injuries that were not apparent
at the time they occurred. The result was that plaintiff was not time-barred, even though defendant's
last act occurred 19 years earlier. In her dissent, Chief Justice Sharp stated that the claim should
have been barred because the defect in the crane was not readily apparent. Raftery, 291 N.C. at 203,
230 S.E.2d at 418 (Sharp, CJ., dissenting).
The majority in Raftery also discussed the balancing of interests behind the statute: adoption of
the discovery rule aided plaintiffs whereas the repose period protected defendants. Raftery, 291 N.C.
at 189, 230 S.E.2d at 410. The Wilder court quoted the following language from Raftery as describ-
ing the purpose of section 1-15(b):
"The purpose of G.S. 1-15(b) was to give relief to injured persons from the harsh
results flowing from this previously established rule of law....
To prevent the statute from subjecting tort feasors to suit for alleged acts or defaults
so far in the past that evidence as to the event would be difficult to secure and intervening
causes would be likely, though difficult to prove, the Legislature added this proviso:
'[p]rovided that in such cases the period [i.e., the period within which the action may be
brought] shall not exceed ten years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the
claim for relief.' (Emphasis added). Expressly, the proviso is limited to 'such cases'; that
is, the proviso applies only to cases in which the bodily injury, or defect in property, for which
damages are sought was not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin. In
such case, the action must be brought within ten years from the wrongful act or default
even though the plaintiff did not discover the injury until later. (Emphasis supplied)."
Wilder, slip op. at 9-10 (quoting Raftery, 291 N.C. at 188-89, 230 S.E.2d at 409-10).
1986]
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the discovery rule, North Carolina courts had followed the common-law rule
that a cause of action accrues at the time of injury. Rigid application of this rule
often had barred plaintiffs with meritorious actions. For example, the Wilder
court cited Shearin v. Lloyd,30 in which plaintiff's malpractice suit against a
doctor who had left a sponge in plaintiff during surgery had been barred by the
statute of limitations because plaintiff's cause of action accrued at the time de-
fendant left the sponge in the body rather than when plaintiff discovered the
sponge. With the enactment of section 1-15(b), North Carolina rejected the
common-law rule and adopted the discovery rule, which provides that a cause of
action does not accrue until the injury is discovered or reasonably should have
been discovered.
3 1
The Wilder court noted that none of the earlier cases that prompted enact-
ment of the discovery rule had involved diseases.32 The court distinguished dis-
eases from other types of injuries, because in the case of disease, it may not be
possible to identify a particular exposure as causing injury.3 3 In particular,
delayed manifestation diseases3 4 may take many years to identify themselves; 35
thus, "[t]he first identifiable injury occurs when the disease is diagnosed as such,
30. 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957); see Wilder, slip op. at 8. The court in Wilder also cited
other examples of the harsh effect of the common-law rule: Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459, 142 S.E.2d
1 (1965) (statute of limitations commenced at time furnace was negligently installed in plaintiff's
house rather than at time of discovery of defendant's negligence after house destroyed by fire); Thur-
ston Motor Lines, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.C. 323, 128 S.E.2d 413 (1962) (statute of
limitations commenced upon sale of vehicle to plaintiff rather than when vehicle destroyed by fire);
Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 73 S.E.2d 320 (1952) (plaintiff brought action for assault and trespass
after discovering that defendant had removed one of plaintiff's ovaries and tied her Fallopian tubes
after she entered hospital for removal of cyst on ovary; court held limitation period began at time of
surgery rather than at time of discovery). See Wilder, slip op. at 8.
31. See Wurfel, Statutes of Limitations in the Conflicts of Laws, 52 N.C.L. Rv. 489, 542-43
n.235 (1974); supra note 23.
32. Wilder, slip op. at 10. In noting that these cases did not involve diseases, the court over-
looked Powers v. Planters Natl Bank & Trust Co., 219 N.C. 254, 13 S.E.2d 431 (1941). Powers is
discussed infra at notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
33. Wilder, slip op. at 10.
34. The Wilder court did not explicitly restrict its analysis to delayed manifestation diseases.
The holding appears to be broad enough to apply to claims arising out of any type of disease. See
Wilder, slip op. at 3 ("G.S. 1-15(b) has no application to claims arising from disease."). The court
suggested that its holding might apply to diseases such as hepatitis. Citing Booker v. Medical
Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979), a case involving hepatitis, the court stated, "Even with
diseases which might be caused by a single harmful exposure such as, for example, hepatitis, it is
ordinarily impossible to determine which of many possible exposures in fact caused the disease."
Wilder, slip op. at 11.
On the other hand, much of the court's analysis appears applicable only to delayed manifesta-
tion diseases. The court is concerned with those situations in which "it is not possible to say pre-
cisely when the disease first occurred in the body." Id. at 15. Most diseases manifest themselves
shortly after exposure to the disease-causing instrumentality; thus, statutes of repose are irrelevant.
Statutes of repose are problematic only when the disease does not manifest itself until many years
after exposure. The court clearly is aware of this fact; it discussed the long manifestation periods for
asbestosis, chronic obstructive lung disease, byssinosis, and silicosis. Id. at 10-11. Whether or not
Wilder could be applied to diseases that do not take years to become apparent, the issue will not
often arise outside the delayed manifestation disease context.
35. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text; see also Wilder, slip op. at 10-11 (citing
Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974) (asbestosis does not manifest itself until 10 to 25 years after exposure; other diseases also
take many years to manifest themselves)).
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and at that time it is no longer latent."'36
From an examination of workers' compensation statutes and cases constru-
ing them, the supreme court concluded that the court and the general assembly
had been aware of the difference between disease and other types of injury in
terms of "identifying legally relevant time periods."' 37 In Blassingame v. South-
ern Asbestos Co., 38 plaintiffs brought a claim under the North Carolina Work-
men's Compensation Act in effect at the time39 for the asbestosis-caused death
of W.S. Blassingame.4° The statute required written notice of "the first distinct
manifestation of an occupational disease.. . within thirty (30) days after such
manifestation, and, in the case of death .. . within ninety (90) days after occur-
rence." 4 1 In addition, a claimant was required to bring a claim for disability or
death within one year after disablement or death, or else the claim would be
barred. 42 Plaintiff's asbestosis was not diagnosed until the autopsy report on
May 10, 1937.4 3 He died on April 1, 1937,44 and his widow filed her claim on
July 20, 1937.45 The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial
Commission's finding that the claim was filed within the applicable ninety-day
period, even though the claim was filed more than ninety days after death.
46
The court stated:
Thus it will be seen that it was humanly impossible for the widow to
have given notice of such death (death resulting from asbestosis)
within ninety days after the death. To construe this section as con-
tended by the defendants would be to deny the benefits conferred by
the act in this and all similar cases. The context of the Compensation
Act does not favor such a strained or technical construction. The
cause of deceased's death could only be ascertained by autopsy, as
above set forth, and notice was given within ninety (90) days after dis-
covery and action brought within one (1) year.47
In another workmen's compensation case, Duncan v. Caipenter & Phil-
lips, 48 plaintiff developed a lung disease after he was exposed to silica dust dur-
ing employment.4 9 Examinations in 1935, 1936, and 1946 revealed lung
impairment, but his condition was not diagnosed as silicosis until November 29,
1948.50 He had stopped work April 23, 1948, and had filed his claim for com-
36. Wilder, slip op. at 10.
37. Id. at 11.
38. 217 N.C. 223, 7 S.E.2d 478 (1940).
39. Act of March 26, 1935, ch. 123, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 130, repealed by N.C. GEN
STAT. § 97-58 (1985).
40. Blassingame, 217 N.C. at 224, 7 S.E.2d at 478.
41. Act of March 26, 1935, ch. 123, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 130, 135, repealed by N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-58 (1985).
42. Id.
43. Blassingame, 217 N.C. at 232, 7 S.E.2d at 483-84.
44. Id. at 224, 7 S.E.2d at 478.
45. Id. at 232, 7 S.E.2d at 484.
46. Id. at 232-33, 7 S.E.2d at 484.
47. Id. at 233, 7 S.E.2d at 484.
48. 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 410 (1951).
49. Id. at 423, 64 S.E.2d at 411.
50. Id. at 423-24, 64 S.E.2d at 412.
1986]
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pensation on April 25, 1949.51 Plaintiff brought suit against defendant one year
and two days after he left work but less than a year after diagnosis of his silico-
sis. 52 The Industrial Commission held that he did not file his claim within one
year of disablement as required by the applicable statute.5 3 The statute provided
that "[tihe time of notice of an occupational disease shall run from the date that
the employee has been advised by competent medical authority that he has
same," 54 but also required notice within one year after death, disability, or dis-
ablement, or the claim would be barred.55 The North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed the Industrial Commission's holding, stating that disablement occurs
when the employee's disease is diagnosed and the employee is informed of that
diagnosis.
56
From its analysis of these two cases, the Wilder court concluded that
"when the legislature considered occupational diseases, it almost always equated
the disease's manifestation or its diagnosis as being the 'injury' from which vari-
ous time periods began to run."' 57 The time limitations in various statutes have
always begun to run upon diagnosis of a disease rather than upon exposure to
the disease-causing instrumentality. Thus, the court reasoned, when section 1-
15(b) was enacted it was not necessary to adopt the discovery rule for injuries
caused by disease-a version of the discovery rule was already in effect for dis-
eases. 58 In addition, if section 1-15(b) did apply to diseases, then a cause of
action would accrue not upon diagnosis, but when the disease was discovered or
reasonably should have been discovered, which could occur prior to diagnosis.5 9
The court found it "inconceivable" that the general assembly intended that a
cause of action for disease could accrue before diagnosis of the disease.
60
The court supported its conclusion that section 1-15(b) was not intended to
apply to diseases by noting that earlier versions of the statute contained refer-
ences to disease that were deleted before the statute was enacted. 6 1 Thus, the
court concluded that section 1-15(b) was adopted purely in reaction to earlier
cases in which statutory time periods were deemed to accrue on the date of
51. Id. at 424, 64 S.E.2d at 412.
52. Id. at 423-24, 64 S.E.2d at 411-12.
53. Act of Mar. 19, 1945, ch. 762, § 1, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 1070, 1070, amended by Act of
Apr. 12, 1955, ch. 525, § 6, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 468, 472.
54. Act of Mar. 19, 1945, ch. 762, § 1, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 1070, 1070.
55. Act of Mar. 19, 1945, oh. 762, § 1, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 1070, 1070, amended by Act of
Apr. 12, 1955, oh. 525, § 6, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 468, 472.
56. Duncan, 233 N.C. at 426-27, 64 S.E.2d at 414. In Wilder, the court quoted the following
language from Duncan:
"Were we to rule otherwise, it would be necessary to hold that it was the legislative intent
to require an employee, in many instances, suffering from any one of these occupational
diseases to make a correct medical diagnosis of his own condition or to file his notice and
claim for compensation before he knew he had such disease, or run the risk of having his
claim barred by the one year statute."
Wilder, slip op. at 14 (quoting Duncan, 233 N.C. at 426-27, 64 S.E.2d at 414).
57. Wilder, slip op. at 14.
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id. at 15-16.
60. Id. at 16.
61. Id. at 16-17.
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injury rather than on discovery of injury. Those cases did not involve disease
claims; section 1-15(b), therefore, was not intended to apply to disease claims.
Thus, plaintiff's claim was not barred and the case was remanded for trial.
62
Although its holding is laudable, the court's reasoning is not. The court's
analysis of the legislative intent behind section 1-15(b) was pure conjecture. It is
possible that the general assembly did not intend for 1-15(b) to apply to disease;
it is more likely that it did not consider the distinction between injury and dis-
ease. The workers' compensation statute in effect when Wilder's condition was
diagnosed required disablement to occur within two years of the last exposure to
asbestos; the current statute allows disablement to occur ten years after expo-
sure.6 3 As Justice Meyer noted in his dissent in Wilder, this treatment of asbes-
tosis claims in the workers' compensation statutes suggests that the general
assembly was perfectly willing to impose a cap on the length of time within
which asbestosis victims could bring suit.64
The majority's conclusion that section 1-15(b) was enacted to adopt the
discovery rule only for nondisease-related claims was based on an incomplete
62. In his dissent, Justice Meyer stated his belief that the majority's result means no statute of
repose applies to occupational disease claims for diseases diagnosed prior to October 1, 1979. WMl-
der, slip op. at 1 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Thus, the only time limit for these claims is that they must
be filed within three years of diagnosis as required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16). Justice Meyer
did not agree that the general assembly intended this result. Wilder, slip op. at 1 (Meyer, J., dissent-
ing). He stated that the general assembly could not have been unaware of the flood of delayed
manifestation claims that reached the courts in the early 1970s and predicted a new flood of delayed
manifestation claims as a result of the majority's holding. Id. at 1-2, 5-6. Section 1-15(b), however,
was enacted in 1971, see supra note 23, so it may have predated the crest of the wave of cases.
Further, it is questionable how many claims based on § 1-15(b) remain in the system to be tried. An
accurate estimate is not currently available. See Cohen, Time Limit Struck Down in Long-Term
Disease Cases, Raleigh News & Observer, Nov. 7, 1985, at IA, col. 1. Justice Meyer also noted that
under the majority opinion, a worker's claim for asbestosis, if diagnosed before October 1, 1979,
would be barred after 10 years from exposure under the workers' compensation system, but would
not be barred by any statute of repose if the employee was not covered by the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, a result Justice Meyer found "absurd." Wilder, slip op. at 4-5 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
63. The opinion does not mention whether plaintiff fied a workers' compensation claim. The
applicable statute at the time would have required that disablement occur within two years after the
last exposure to asbestos:
[Ain employer shall not be liable for any compensation for asbestosis or silicosis or lead
poisoning unless disablement or death results within two years after the last exposure to
such disease, or, in case of death, unless death follows continuous disablement from such
disease, commencing within the period of two years limited herein, and for which compen-
sation has been paid or awarded or timely claim made as hereinafter provided and results
within seven years after such last exposure in the case of lead poisoning, or 350 weeks in
the case of asbestosis or silicosis.
Act of April 12, 1955, ch. 525, § 6, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 468, 472.
The current statute extends to 10 years the period in which disablement must occur to recover
for asbestosis:
[An] employer shall not be liable for any compensation for asbestosis unless disablement or
death results within 10 years after the last exposure to that disease, or, in the case of death,
unless death follows continuous disablement from such disease, commencing within the
period of 10 years limited herein, and for which compensation has been paid or awarded or
timely claim made.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58(a) (Supp. 1983).
Presumably, if Wilder had filed a workers' compensation claim, it would have been barred by
the 1979 version of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58(a), which required that disablement occur within two
years of last exposure.
64. Wilder, slip op. at 4 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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analysis of the cases preceding the statute's enactment. The court stated that
prior to enactment of section 1-15(b), statutory periods for disease-related claims
were deemed to start running from the time of diagnosis. However, in Powers v.
Planters National Bank & Trust Co., 65 plaintiff alleged defendant had conveyed
property to him in 1934 that had been infected with tuberculosis germs without
informing him about the tuberculosis. Plaintiff contracted tuberculosis and
commenced his action in 1938.66 The court affirmed a judgment of nonsuit for
defendant, holding that the three-year statute of limitations began to run from
the time of defendant's wrongful act rather than from the time of discovery of
the tuberculosis germs. 67 In failing to discuss Powers, the Wilder court over-
looked the fact that the discovery rule had not been applied uniformly to disease
cases prior to enactment of section 1-15(b).
Although reports shortly after the Wilder decision anticipated that the deci-
sion would apply to the current statutes,6 8 that result is far from certain. The
court's only reference to either of those statutes was that "G.S 1-15(b) is not
intended to be a statute of limitations governing all negligence claims, such as
the statute of limitations contained in the first clause of G.S. 1-52(16)."69 Jus-
tice Meyer interpreted this reference to mean that section 1-52(16) would not
bar claims based on occupational diseases diagnosed before October 1, 1979 (the
effective date of section 1-15(b)'s repeal and section 1-52(16)'s enactment), but
would bar claims based on diagnoses after that date.70 The language of section
1-52(16) is similar to that of section 1-15(b), except that it does not contain an
exception for wrongful death claims.7 1 Section 1-50(6), however, clearly states
that no action for personal injury or death caused by a product shall be brought
more than six years after the product was first purchased for use or consump-
tion.7 2 There is nothing in the language of section 1-50(6) to suggest that its
repose provision does not apply to delayed manifestation diseases.
In addition, although it is probably true that the general assembly's primary
purpose in enacting section 1-15(b) and its replacement, 1-52(16), was to adopt
the discovery rule,73 section 1-50(6) appears to have been enacted for an entirely
different purpose. The general assembly probably enacted section 1-50(6) to
provide repose for manufacturers-that is, to ensure that manufacturers would
not be held liable for injuries caused by their products later than six years after
sale of the products.74 At the time section 1-50(6) was enacted, asbestosis had
65. 219 N.C. 254, 13 S.E.2d 431 (1941).
66. Id. at 255, 13 S.E.2d at 431.
67. Id. at 256, 13 S.E.2d at 432.
68. E.g., Editorial, Justice for Product Victims, Raleigh News & Observer, Nov. 8, 1985, at
18A, col. 1. For the text of the current statutes, see supra note 23.
69. Wilder, slip op. at 7.
70. Id. at 1, 6 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
71. See supra note 23 for the text of these statutes.
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (1983) (text quoted supra at note 23).
73. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
74. The statute was passed as part of the Products Liability Act. See supra note 23. The word-
ing of the statute makes it clear that its primary purpose was to provide repose. In enacting the
statute, the general assembly may have been responding to the products liability "crisis" of the
1970s. See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
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received widespread public attention.7 5 The general assembly surely was aware
of the increasing number of products liability lawsuits based on exposure to as-
bestos. Thus, it would be difficult to apply the analysis in Wilder to section 1-
50(6). The uncertainty surrounding the current statutes' applicability in delayed
manifestation cases is a serious problem because at least one of the statutes has
been used to bar asbestosis claims.
76
The majority's reliance on statutory interpretation suggests that it was seek-
ing to avoid the troublesome question whether statutes such as section 1-15(b)
are constitutional. Plaintiff in Wilder argued the unconstitutionality of such
statutes in his brief;77 the statutory argument adopted by the court had received
far less attention from the parties than had the constitutionality argument.
78
The North Carolina Supreme Court eventually will have to decide whether stat-
utes of repose are constitutional as applied to delayed manifestation diseases be-
cause, as discussed above, the analysis in Wilder probably does not apply to the
North Carolina statutes of repose currently in effect.
In Barwick v. Celotex Corp.,79 appellant challenged the constitutionality of
section 1-15(b), 80 arguing that it violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitutions ' and the "open courts"8 2
and equal protection guarantees8 3 of the North Carolina Constitution. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit predicted that the North
Carolina Supreme Court would hold the statute constitutional.8 4 The Barwick
court's analysis will be relevant should the North Carolina Supreme Court have
75. See generally Brodeur, supra note 3 (four part article reporting the legal battles concerning
asbestos-related disease during the last century with emphasis on the Manville Corporation).
76. See infra note 200.
77. The plaintiff's primary constitutional argument was that the statute violated the open
courts clause of the North Carolina Constitution. Appellant's Brief at 32. Plaintiff also contended
that the statute violated the exclusive emoluments provision of the North Carolina Constitution and
the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. Id. at 36-41.
78. Compare Appellant's Brief at 28-29 (one and one-half pages arguing statute inapplicable to
disease) and Appellees' Brief at 45-47 (three pages arguing statute applicable to disease) with Appel-
lant's Brief at 30-41 (twelve pages arguing statute unconstitutional) and Appellees' Brief at 68-94
(twenty-seven pages arguing statute constitutional). The supreme court's analysis appears to have
been drawn largely from an amicus curiae brief filed by the North Carolina White Lung Association.
See Amicus Curiae Brief at 11-18.
79. 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984). Barwick worked as a steam fitter and plumber from 1961 to
1980. He was informed he had asbestosis on January 10, 1979. Id. at 952. He filed actions against
manufacturers of asbestos-containing products he claimed caused his asbestosis, id. at 949, alleging
exposure to their products throughout his employment, without stating dates. Id. at 952. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina granted defendants' motion
for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff had raised no issue of material fact as to exposure to
defendants' products during the ten-year period set forth in § 1-15(b). Id. at 953. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. Therefore, plaintiff's claim was held barred
by § 1-15(b) even though he was not aware he had asbestosis until after the statutory period had
expired.
80. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 955.
81. "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I.
82. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18 provides: "All courts shall be open; every person for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law; and right
and justice shall be administered without favor, denial or delay."
83. Id. §§ 19, 32.
84. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 957-58.
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to decide the constitutionality of sections 1-52(16) or 1-50(6) as applied to a
delayed manifestation disease case. The flaws in the Fourth Circuit's reasoning
illustrate that the North Carolina Supreme Court should hold the current stat-
utes unconstitutional as applied to delayed manifestation disease claims.
Although the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Barwick does not make it clear,
appellant's equal protection argument arose under two different provisions of
the North Carolina Constitution: the equal protection clause, which provides
that "[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws,"85 and the
"exclusive emoluments" clause, which provides that "[n]o person. . . is entitled
to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in
consideration of public service."'8 6 The court's analysis of what it refers to as
appellant's equal protection claim confuses these two clauses.8 7 A review of the
history of these two clauses, however, will help to clarify appellant's equal pro-
tection arguments.
The principle of equal protection of the law was not expressly incorporated
into the North Carolina Constitution until July 1, 1971.88 Prior to that time, the
principle had been applied to the State only by way of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.8 9 Equal protection means that a legisla-
ture cannot discriminate arbitrarily between individuals or groups.90 Courts
traditionally have used a "two-tiered" analysis of equal protection claims.9 1
When a law classifies persons based on their ability to exercise a fundamental
right or upon a "suspect" basis, strict scrutiny is required and the government
must show that the classification is a necessary means to achieve a compelling
governmental interest.9 2 When the classification does not involve a fundamental
right or a suspect class, the government need only show that the classification
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. 93 It is not
necessary that the legislation reach every class to which it might be applied.9 4
As the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated, "[T]he only requirement nec-
essary to comply with the equal protection provisions of both the federal and
state constitutions is that the classification be reasonable and bear a rational
85. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
86. Id. § 32.
87. For example, at one point the court refers to the equal protection clause of the North
Carolina Constitution but cites the exclusive emoluments clause. See Barwick, 736 F.2d at 955.
88. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654, 660, 178 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1971). The equal protec-
tion principle was incorporated into the state constitution by way of N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19. S.S.
Kresge Co., 277 N.C. at 660, 178 S.E.2d at 385. For the language of this section, see supra text
accompanying note 85.
89. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654, 660, 178 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1971).
90. Raleigh Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 276 N.C. 661, 666-67, 174 S.E.2d 542, 546
(1970).
91. Abbott v. Town of Iighlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 75, 277 S.E.2d 820, 824 (quoting Texl
Indus. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 10-11, 269 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1980)), disc. rev. denied, 303
N.C. 710, 283 S.E.2d 136 (1981).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 75-76, 277 S.E.2d at 824-25.




relationship to a permissible state objective." 95
The "exclusive emoluments" clause has been applied in a slightly different
context. This provision prevents certain individuals or groups from receiving
special privileges from the State. For example, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has held that a statute which required dry cleaners to be licensed, but
excluded those in several counties, violated the exclusive emoluments clause be-
cause it extended a privilege to the dry cleaners who did not have to pay the
license fee.96 Similarly, a statute making it unlawful to discharge poisonous sub-
stances into streams but exempting corporations chartered before a certain date
was held unconstitutional. 97 The North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
[T]he date line running through the statute has no reasonable relation
to the purpose of the law, only serving to mechanically split into two
groups persons in like situation[s] with regard to the subject matter
dealt with but in sharply contrasting positions as to the incidence and
effect of the law; and.. . the attempted classification is not based
upon a justifiable distinction.
98
When a privilege is granted to a group in consideration of public service,
however, the constitutional prohibition against exclusive emoluments is not vio-
lated. Thus, a statute allowing veterans to become barbers without the examina-
tion and apprenticeship required of others was constitutional because the
privilege was granted in consideration of the veterans' military service.99
Although both the equal protection and the exclusive emoluments clauses
of the state constitution concern legislatively created distinctions among individ-
uals or groups, they do not have identical meanings. The equal protection clause
protects against unfair discrimination, whereas the exclusive emoluments clause
prevents the conferring of special privileges. At times, however, the same gov-
ernmental act may violate both provisions.100 Conversely, when there is a rea-
sonable basis for a distinction among individuals or groups, the distinction may
not violate either constitutional provision.'
0 1
In Barwick plaintiff's "equal protection" argument charged that the chal-
lenged statute promoted the interests of special groups over the interests of in-
jured parties and that the statute served no legitimate public purpose.1 02
Clearly, this argument is both an equal protection and an exclusive emoluments
argument. Plaintiff contended that he was a member of a special class of claim-
95. Responsible Citizens in Opposition to the Flood Plain Ordinance v. City of Asheville 308
N.C. 255, 268-69, 302 S.E.2d 204, 213 (1983).
96. State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 753, 6 S.E.2d 854, 859 (1940). The statute was found to
violate N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 7-an earlier version of art. I, § 32.
97. State v. Glidden Co., 228 N.C. 664, 46 S.E.2d 860 (1948).
98. Id. at 668, 46 S.E.2d at 862.
99. Motley v. State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 228 N.C. 337, 45 S.E.2d 550 (1947).
100. E.g., In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729
(1973) (denial of certificate of need on grounds new hospital would endanger ability of other hospi-
tals to keep their beds filled was unconstitutional).
101. See, ag., Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983) (architectural
statute of repose constitutional); State v. Knight, 269 N.C. 100, 152 S.E.2d 179 (1967) (exclusion of
certain categories of jurors constitutional).
102. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 958.
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ants with latent diseases who were affected unfairly by the statute10 3 and that
the statute created a special class of defendants (manufacturers). ° 4 The former
is the equal protection argument; the latter argument is essentially an exclusive
emoluments argument-a contention that manufacturers unconstitutionally re-
ceived a special privilege under the statute of repose. The Fourth Circuit re-
jected both arguments.'
0 5
The court prefaced its examination of the legislative purpose behind section
1-15(b) with the affirmation that statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitu-
tionality.10 6 Therefore, the burden of proof was on plaintiff. The court asserted
that section 1-15(b) had been enacted for the purpose of adopting the discovery
rule,l0 7 and disposed of plaintiff's argument that section 1-15(b) restricted the
rights of plaintiffs with latent injuries by saying that the statute had improved
rather than worsened the situation of most plaintiffs.10 8 Defendants received the
protection of the ten-year repose period to balance the advantage to plaintiffs
resulting from the adoption of the discovery rule. 10 9 Thus, defendants received
no special privileges in violation of the exclusive emoluments clause.
Responding further to plaintiff's claim that he was denied equal protec-
tion, 11 the court stated that there was a legitimate public purpose behind sec-
tion 1-15(b)."' Repose itself was found to be a legitimate public purpose,
especially when balanced against plaintiffs' "expanded rights" under the stat-
ute.112 As long as the statute had a rational basis,113 the court reasoned, it did
not violate the equal protection clause." 4 The court failed to address specifi-
cally whether there was a rational basis for distinguishing between plaintiffs with
delayed manifestation diseases and other plaintiffs.
Plaintiff's final constitutional argument was that the statute violated the
open courts provision of the North Carolina Constitution. This argument was
based on the allegation that appellant had been denied a remedy for his injury in
violation of the open courts provision's requirement that every person be
103. Id. at 956.
104. Id.
105. The court did not distinguish between equal protection under the United States and North
Carolina constitutions. Presumably such a distinction is unnecessary because the principle is applied
in the same manner under both constitutions. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
106. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 955. The North Carolina Supreme Court recently made a similar
pronouncement. Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 314 N.C. 44, 49, 332 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1985).
107. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
108. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 955-56.
109. Id. at 956.
110. Id. at 958.
111. In its analysis of the public purpose of § 1-15(b), the court relied heavily upon Raftery v.
Win. C. Vick Construction Co., 291 N.C. 180, 230 S.E.2d 405 (1976). See supra note 29 for a
discussion of Raftery.
112. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 958.
113. The court concluded that the rational basis test was appropriate because the statute did not
"infringe a fundamental right [or] involve a suspect classification." Id.; see supra notes 88-95 and
accompanying text.
114. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 958.
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granted a remedy by due course of law for personal injuries.115 The Fourth
Circuit also rejected this argument. The court observed that although a govern-
ment must provide its citizens with remedies, 116 it can establish time limits
within which these remedies must be sought. 117 Time limits established by the
general assembly do not unconstitutionally deprive plaintiffs of remedies because
the open courts clause provides for a remedy "by due course of law," not an
absolute right to relief."1
8
Because the North Carolina Supreme Court had not ruled on the constitu-
tionality of North Carolina General Statutes section 1-15(b), 119 the Fourth Cir-
cuit supported its prediction of how the supreme court would have decided
Barwick by citing a North Carolina Supreme Court case and cases from other
jurisdictions holding similar statutes constitutional. In Lamb v. Wedgewood
South Corp.,'2 0 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that North Carolina
General Statutes section 1-50(5),121 a statute barring claims against architects
and builders arising out of defects in property after six years, was constitutional.
The supreme court recognized that this statute and other statutes of repose may
bar rights of action before injury occurs, 122 but held that the statute did not
violate the equal protection clauses of the state or federal constitutions because it
involved a reasonable classification. 123 The Lamb court also rejected plaintiff's
argument that the statute violated the open courts provision of the North Caro-
115. Id. at 958. See infra note 118 for a discussion of North Carolina case law applying the open
courts clause. The language of the open courts provision is quoted supra at note 82.
116. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 955.
117. Id. The court cited Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902). Wilson makes it clear that
such time limits must be reasonable, and that the purpose of such limits is to prevent negligence and
delay on the part of plaintiffs. Wilson, 185 U.S. at 62.
118. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 958. To support its conclusion the court cited Lamb v. Wedgewood
S. Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983). In Lamb the North Carolina Supreme Court stated
that although the state constitution guarantees the right to a remedy, the remedy must be legally
cognizable. The general assembly has the power to define the circumstances under which a remedy
is cognizable. Id. at 444, 302 S.E.2d at 882. Thus, "unless the injury occurs within the six-year
period [set forth in § 1-50(5)], there is no cognizable claim." Id. at 440, 302 S.E.2d at 880. See also
infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussion of reliance on Lamb in a more recent North
Carolina Supreme Court case on statute of repose). For further discussion of Lamb, see infra notes
120-24 and accompanying text.
There is not much North Carolina case law applying the open courts clause to statutes of re-
pose. A statute of repose was challenged on the basis of the open courts clause in Bolick v. Ameri-
can Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified, 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d
415 (1982). The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) was uncon-
stitutional on its face because it violated the open courts provision of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that
plaintiff did not have standing to attack the constitutionality of the statute. See infra note 135 and
accompanying text. For discussion of an unsuccessful challenge after Lamb, see infra note 124. See
also Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904) (court discussed open courts provision in
libel case).
119. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 957. The North Carolina Supreme Court had the opportunity to
address the constitutionality of the statute in Wilder but chose not to do so. See supra notes 77-78
and accompanying text.
120. 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983).
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (1983).
122. Lamb, 308 N.C. at 427, 302 S.E.2d at 872.
123. Id. at 434-39, 302 S.E.2d at 876-80.
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lina Constitution by barring his claim unless it arose within six years.
124
The North Carolina Supreme Court's language in Lamb may have influ-
enced the court's decision not to discuss the constitutionality of section 1-15(b)
in Wilder. The court might have believed that it would be difficult to reconcile
its support of the statute of repose in Lamb with a finding that a similar statute
was unconstitutional in a different context. Lamb, however, does not require a
finding that the application of section 1-15(b) and other statutes of repose in
delayed manifestation cases is constitutional. In Lamb there was no argument
that the statute unreasonably discriminated among plaintiffs, whereas the statute
as applied in Barwick unreasonably discriminated against plaintiffs with delayed
manifestation diseases. Although this discriminatory result was avoided in Wil-
der, there is no guarantee that it will not recur in cases governed by sections 1-
52(16) and 1-50(6).
In addition to Lamb, the Fourth Circuit in Barwick also relied on Pitts v.
Unarco Industries,125 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit held an Indiana statute of repose constitutional. Pitts involved a
wrongful death action against asbestos manufacturers. The court held that
plaintiff's claim was barred by Indiana's ten-year statute of repose and that the
statute did not violate the due process or equal protection provisions of the fed-
eral or state constitutions.
126
Finally, the Barwick court cited Hawkins v. D & J Press Co., Inc. 127 In
Hawkins the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
found the Tennessee ten-year statute of repose constitutional as applied to a
plaintiff who was injured in an industrial accident. The statute at issue in Haw-
kins, however, contained the following provision: "The foregoing limitation of
actions shall not apply to any action resulting from exposure to asbestos."1 28 In
an earlier case,12 9 the statute without the asbestos exception had been applied to
an asbestosis case and found constitutional. The legislature then excepted ac-
tions resulting from exposure to asbestos from the statute,130 thus indicating
124. Id. at 440-45, 302 S.E.2d at 880-83. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit relied on Lamb in Hines v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 728 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1984), in holding
that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) did not violate the open courts clause of the North Carolina Consti-
tution.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals followed Lamb in Square D. Co. v. C.J. Kern Contrac-
tors, Inc., 70 N.C. App. 30, 318 S.E.2d 527 (1984), holding § 1-50(5) constitutional. In his dissent,
Judge Phillips acknowledged that the majority opinion was in accord with the supreme court's unan-
imous decision in Lamb, but stated his view that the statute is unconstitutional because the general
assembly had no rational basis for immunizing architects and builders against liability after only six
years. Id. at 39, 318 S.E.2d at 532 (Phillips, J., dissenting). He also stated that the statute "render[s]
meaningless" the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions and the open courts
provision of the state constitution. Id. He described the statute as "an abolition of accountability to
the public for a special class, in exchange for which no one else in society gets anything whatever."
Id.
125. 712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
126. Id.; see also Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1983) (statute of
repose held constitutional in asbestosis case), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2690 (1984).
127. 527 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
128. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(b) (1980). See infra note 210 for language of the statute.
129. Buckner v. GAF Corp., 495 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
130. See Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 404 (5th Cir. 1984) (rational basis for
[Vol. 64
STATUTES OF REPOSE
disapproval of the court's result.
The Fourth Circuit in Barwick failed to cite additional cases from North
Carolina and other jurisdictions that are relevant to the issue of the constitution-
ality of North Carolina's statutes of repose. In a recent North Carolina case,
Bolick v. American Barmag Corp.,l3 1 plaintiff was injured when he caught his
hand in a machine that had been manufactured by defendant and sold more than
six years earlier. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant on
the ground that plaintiff's claim was barred by North Carolina General Statutes
section 1-50(6),l32 the six-year statute of repose for products liability cases. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding section 1-50(6) unconstitu-
tional on its face.' 3 3 The court reasoned that the statute extinguished the right
to assert claims in cases in which the statute would bar them. Thus, the statute
abolished the right to seek redress for injuries guaranteed by the open courts
provision. 134 On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the stat-
ute did not apply to plaintiff's action and therefore, that he had no standing to
attack its constitutionality. 135 Although the supreme court avoided addressing
the constitutionality of section 1-50(6) in Bolick, it did discuss the constitution-
ality of section 1-50(6) in a recent case, Tetterton v. Long Manufacturing Co.,1
3 6
which was decided after Barwick and supports the Barwick court's conclusion.
In Tetterton plaintiff's husband was killed while he was operating a tobacco
harvester the defendant manufacturer had sold more than six years earlier. On
the basis of section 1-50(6), the trial court granted summary judgment for de-
fendant.13 7 On appeal, plaintiff challenged the statute's constitutionality, 138 ar-
guing that it violated the equal protection clauses of the state
13 9 and federal' 40
constitutions and the exclusive emoluments14 1 and open courts
14 2 provisions of
the North Carolina Constitution and that it was unconstitutionally vague. 143
asbestos exception); Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289, 1291 (6th Cir. 1983) (legisla-
ture made a mistake in not originally including an exception for asbestos exposure), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 3537 (1984).
The Tennessee statute still may be applied to bar claims arising out of other types of delayed
manifestation diseases. See, eg., Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983) (DES case).
131. 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified, 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982).
132. The text of § 1-50(6) is quoted supra at note 23.
133. Bolick, 54 N.C. App. at 590, 284 S.E.2d at 189; see also Survey of Developments in North
Carolina Law-Constitutional Law, 1981, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1272, 1285-86 (1982) (describing Bolick
holding).
134. Bolick, 54 N.C. App. at 592-93, 284 S.E.2d at 191-92.
135. Bolick, 306 N.C. at 365, 293 S.E.2d at 417.
136. 314 N.C. 44, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985).
137. Id. at 46, 332 S.E.2d at 68.
138. Id. at 47-48, 332 S.E.2d at 69.
139. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19. See supra text accompanying note 85 for the language of this
clause.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 81 for the language of this clause.
141. N.C. CONsr. art. I, § 32. See supra text accompanying note 86 for the language of this
clause.
142. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18. See supra note 82 for the language of this clause.
143. The court rejected this argument, holding that the normal rules of statutory construction
rectify any ambiguous statutory language of the act. See Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 54-56, 332 S.E.2d at
73-74.
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The supreme court rejected these challenges. Although Tetterton did not in-
volve delayed manifestation diseases, the court's reasoning in Tetterton is rele-
vant to the constitutionality of section 1-50(6) as applied to delayed
manifestation diseases.
The court in Tetterton rejected plaintiff's equal protection argument that
the statute impermissibly distinguished between manufacturers and retailers by
explaining that the statute was applicable to both manufacturers and retailers.
144
Similarly, the court rejected the argument that section 1-50(6) creates exclusive
emoluments because the statute "does not on its face create a distinction be-
tween. . groups." 145 The court also rejected plaintiff's open courts argument,
relying on its language in Lamb: "'We do not believe it correct to say that the
statute bars a claim before the injury giving rise to the claim occurs. The stat-
ute's effect is that unless the injury occurs within the six-year period, there is no
cognizable claim.' "146
Significantly, the Tetterton court also repeated the observation of the Lamb
court that" 'the legislature might pass a statute of repose that had a time period
so short that it would effectively abolish all potential claims.' ",147 In cases in-
volving durable goods, the court noted, over ninety-seven percent of accidents
occur within six years of the date of purchase. 148 The court implied that be-
cause the vast majority of injuries caused by products such as tobacco harvesters
will occur within the statutory six-year period, the statute does not violate the
open courts clause. In contrast, when the vast majority of injuries caused by a
particular type of product, such as asbestos, will occur after the statutory period
has expired, 149 the statute should be found to violate the open courts clause
when applied to bar claims based on injuries caused by that product.
The Tetterton court also discussed the general assembly's purpose in enact-
ing section 1-50(6). The statute was enacted to shield manufacturers from liabil-
ity for an indefinite length of time for injuries caused by durable goods.150 As
discussed below,15 1 the statute was enacted in response to the products liability
"crisis" 15 2 of the 1970s to limit the "long 'tail,' or period of potential liability"
for manufacturers.15 3 If the Tetterton court was correct about the legislative
purpose behind section 1-50(6), then much of the analysis in Wilder will not
144. Id. at 49-52, 332 S.E.2d at 70-72. The effect of the statute in this case, however, was to bar
plaintiff's claim against the manufacturer, who sold the machine in 1971, while preserving plaintiff's
claim against the retailer, who sold the machine in 1975 (plaintiff's husband was killed in 1981). Id.
at 46, 51, 332 S.E.2d at 68, 71.
145. Id. at 53, 332 S.E.2d at 72.
146. Id. (quoting Lamb, 308 N.C. at 440, 302 S.E.2d at 880).
147. Id. at 54, 332 S.E.2d at 73 (quoting Lamb, 308 N.C. at 444 n.7, 302 S.E.2d at 882 n.7).
148. Id.
149. Plaintiff in Wilder stated: "In the case of asbestos-related diseases. . . use of even a ten
year statute of repose will preclude almost all potential asbestos claims from ever being asserted."
Appellant's Brief at 31.
150. Tetterton, 34 N.C. at 55, 332 S.E.2d at 73-74.
151. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
152. See Dworkin, Product Liability of the 1980v "Repose is not the Destiny" of Manufacturers,
61 N.C.L. REv. 33, 54 (1982).
153. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 55, 332 S.E.2d at 73-74 (quoting McGovern, supra note 1, at 593).
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apply to the current statute. Because section 1-50(6) was enacted to provide
repose to manufactures and not to enact the discovery rule, 154 it may have been
intended to apply to claims arising from diseases such as asbestosis. To alleviate
the uncertainty surrounding the current statutes of repose, the North Carolina
Supreme Court should address the constitutionality of the current statutes.
As the Tetterton court observed, courts in other jurisdictions have held stat-
utes of repose unconstitutional per se (including, but not limited to cases consid-
ering their application in delayed manifestation cases). The supreme courts of
Alabama,' 5 5 Florida,' 56 New Hampshire, 157 and Rhode Island 55 have found
statutes of repose similar to section 1-15(b), the statute challenged in Barwick,
unconstitutional. The Alabama Supreme Court found that a ten-year statute of
repose violated the state constitution's open courts provision, which is virtually
identical to North Carolina's. 159 The court reasoned that legislation which lim-
its a common-law right is valid if the right is relinquished in exchange for
equivalent benefits or if it eradicates a social evil. 6° The statute of repose did
not meet either requirement.' 6 ' Even statutes that do not abrogate common-law
rights must not be arbitrary or capricious. 162 The challenged statute of repose
was arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional. 163 Similarly, the Florida Supreme
Court found that a twelve-year statute of repose violated the access to the courts
provision of the state constitution. 164
A New Hampshire twelve-year statue of repose was found unconstitu-
tional165 because it barred some causes of action before they arose, 166 was not
154. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
155. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982) (plaintiffs injured when
"manlift" elevator collapsed and fell).
156. Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980) (products liability action;
type of product unclear); see also Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981) (same
result in a DES or delayed manifestation case).
157. Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 525, 464 A.2d 288, 295 (1983) (consolidated
actions based on allegedly defective ratchet, crane, milling machine, wall heater, saw blade, motorcy-
cle, portable commode, mobile home cooking system, and forklift; court refers to delayed manifesta-
tion diseases).
158. Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 200 (ILI. 1984) (plaintiff allegedly in-
jured while using machine; court discusses delayed manifestation diseases) (citing Heath v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983)).
159. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides: "That all courts shall be open; and that every person,
for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due
process of law; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay." Compare
this clause with N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18, quoted supra at note 82.
160. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1000 (Ala. 1982) (cited in Tetterton,
314 N.C. at 58, 332 S.E.2d at 75).
161. Id. at 1001-03.
162. Id. at 1003.
163. Id.
164. See Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874, 874 (Fla. 1980) (cited in Tetterton,
314 N.C. at 58, 332 S.E.2d at 75). FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 provides: "The courts shall be open to
every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay."
165. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 14 provides:
Every subject of this state is entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws,
for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or character, to obtain right and
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substantially related to a legitimate legislative objective, 167 and denied products
liability plaintiffs equal protection of the laws.168 Finally, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the state's ten-year statute of repose denied access to
the courts in violation of the state constitution:
169
To prohibit court access absolutely for a generally recognized claim to
a class of plaintiffs merely because they were injured by a product
more than ten years old not only is irrational, in our opinion, but also
flies in the face of even minimal constitutional protection .... 170
Although the analysis in these cases was rejected in Tetterton, the cases
provide examples of alternative treatments of the issues raised in Barwick. The
Tetterton court rejected the constitutionality arguments presented in these cases
in the context of a defective machine, but the supreme court should be more
receptive to these arguments in a delayed manifestation disease case. The Wil-
der court's approach appears to be a novel treatment of statutes of repose in the
context of delayed manifestation diseases. The court in Wilder clearly recog-
nized the unfairness of barring causes of action for diseases before plaintiffs
know they exist, but the court avoided holding statutes that have this effect un-
constitutional. The result is uncertainty for plaintiffs whose claims are governed
by more recent statutes. The North Carolina Supreme Court at its next oppor-
tunity should find North Carolina's statutes of repose unconstitutional when ap-
plied in delayed manifestation cases. The statutes distinguish between plaintiffs
whose injuries manifest themselves within a certain number of years and those
whose injuries do not manifest themselves until after the repose period has
elapsed. Because of the long latency period of diseases such as asbestosis, an
entire group of plaintiffs very often will be deprived of a remedy. In addition,
the statutes of repose confer a benefit on manufacturers of products such as
those containing asbestos that is not enjoyed by manufacturers of other types of
products. To be permissible under the equal protection clause of the state17 '
and federal 172 constitutions and the exclusive emoluments 173 provision of the
North Carolina constitution, the distinctions between groups of plaintiffs and
justice freely, without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial;
promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.
166. Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 525, 464 A.2d 288, 295 (1983).
167. Id. at 526, 464 A.2d at 296. The court required a substantial relationship between the
statute and a legitimate legislative objective. The court recognized that there was a crisis in products
liability insurance, but found that the statute had become "entirely divorced from its underlying
purpose." Id. Rather than furthering any legitimate public purpose, the court found the statute
arbitrarily deprived certain injured plaintiffs of the right to sue manufacturers. Id.
168. Id.
169. R.IL CONST. art. I, § 5 provides:
Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the
laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character.
He ought to obtain right and justice freely and without purchase, completely and without
denial; conformably to the laws.
170. Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 198 (R.I. 1984). The dissenting opinion
in Kennedy (Murray, J., dissenting) was cited favorably in Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 58, 332 S.E.2d at
75.
171. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 19. See supra text accompanying note 85 for the language of this
provision.
172. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 81 for the language of this provision.
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among types of manufacturers must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental objective. 174
As the Wilder court recognized, the primary purpose of section 1-15(b) ap-
pears to have been enactment of the discovery rule. 175 The ten-year limitation
was no doubt included to facilitate passage of the statute. Prior to Wilder and
Barwick, section 1-15(b) had been applied primarily in the "old product" con-
text.' 76 Such old product cases are distinguishable from delayed manifestation
cases. Most injuries caused by defective products occur before the period of
repose has expired; 177 thus, most deserving plaintiffs can recover. Delayed man-
ifestation diseases, however, frequently do not become apparent until after the
period has elapsed.' 78 Asbestosis, for example, usually does not manifest itself
until ten to twenty years after exposure to asbestos 179 and may take more than
twenty years to manifest itself.180 Mesothelioma, another disease caused by ex-
posure to asbestos, usually does not manifest itself until twenty or more years
after exposure to asbestos. 181 Approximately eighty asbestos-related lawsuits
have been filed in North Carolina since the first in 1979, and 30,000 to 40,000
such suits are fied nationwide each year.'8 2 Thus, large numbers of plaintiffs
potentially are denied relief because of statutes of repose.' 83 Although those
plaintiffs whose asbestosis was diagnosed prior to October 1, 1979, now may
recover, many other plaintiffs still may be barred by sections 1-52(16) and 1-
50(6).
Although a ten or six-year statute of repose does not preclude many other
kinds of products liability claims, it does bar many delayed manifestation claims,
such as those arising from exposure to asbestos. Therefore, unlike in old prod-
ucts cases in which most plaintiffs are given access to the courts, the Barwick
173. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32. See supra text accompanying note 86 for the language of this
provision.
174. See supra notes 90-95 & 101 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
176. See, eg., Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982) (plaintiff injured while
playing hockey when mouthguard shattered; claim not barred because last act of defendant occurred
within previous 10 years).
177. McGovern, supra note 1, at 593.
178. Dworkin, supra note 152, at 43 n.65.
179. Id. at 35 n.13; see supra notes 34-35.
180. W. PARKEs, supra note 3, at 268.
181. Id. at 276. Mesothelioma is a cancer of the pleural lining of the lungs or of the peritoneal
lining of the abdomen. Unlike asbestosis, mesothelioma is 100% fatal. Id. at 292; Arai & Weill,
Clinical Problems in Asbestos-Related Diseases, in AsBESTos-RELATED DisEASE 22 (L. Preger ed.
1978).
182. Durham Morning Herald, Sept. 15, 1984, at BI, col. 1. Justice Meyer stated that 1,500 to
2,000 asbestosis suits have been filed in North Carolina state courts and the United States district
courts for North Carolina, and that there are 25,000 asbestosis suits pending in the United States.
Wilder, slip op. at 2 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
183. An asbestosis victim may be denied workers' compensation and tort relief as well. It has
been suggested that both the workers' compensation and the tort systems developed to deal with
industrial accidents and are not well-suited for compensating victims of occupational diseases such
as asbestosis. Accidents are discrete events for which a clear cause and effect relationship often
exists. Occupational diseases develop over time and their origins are often unclear. The tort and
workers' compensation systems in many jurisdictions have not provided for these differences. Note,
Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916 (1980).
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court's argument that the negative effect of the time limit on plaintiffs is bal-
anced by the discovery rule'8 4 does not hold in many delayed manifestation
cases. In addition, this argument would not apply to section 1-50(6), which was
not enacted to adopt the discovery rule. Instead, section 1-50(6) appears to have
been enacted to ensure repose for manufacturers.18 5 Thus, there was no corre-
sponding benefit to plaintiffs to counterbalance the advantage to defendants.
Other rationales behind statutes of repose are likewise not applicable to as-
bestos litigation.' 8 6 Specifically, manufacturers contend that statutes of repose
lead to more reasonable insurance rates and thus decrease the costs of prod-
ucts. 18 7 In the asbestos area, however, manufacturers often can no longer get
insurance, regardless of the period of liability.18 8 Another reason for statutes of
repose is that they eliminate stale claims in which evidence has disappeared.18 9
Evidence in asbestos litigation, however, improves rather than deteriorates with
time.190 Furthermore, "although holding an ordinary manufacturer responsible
in perpetuity for a product with a finite useful [safe] life seems harsh, asbestos
has no useful safe life; it is dangerous from the beginning and remains
dangerous."191
The court in Barwick found that repose itself was a legitimate public pur-
pose.' 92 Repose indeed may be a legitimate goal in some instances, 193 but not in
the case of products that cause delayed manifestation injuries. 194 Manufacturers
do not want to be held liable in perpetuity for injuries caused by their products.
A product may be safe when manufactured, but the costs of ensuring safety
beyond a certain length of time may make costs of production inordinately high.
Products containing asbestos, however, are dangerous when they are manufac-
tured. They do not become more dangerous with the passage of time. It is
arbitrary, therefore, to distinguish between plaintiffs injured by exposure to as-
bestos and those injured by other types of products. Likewise, there is no clear
rationale for allowing manufacturers of asbestos to avoid liability for injuries
caused by their products when other manufacturers are liable simply because
injuries caused by their products manifest themselves within a shorter time
period.
The North Carolina statutes of repose also violate the state constitution's
open courts provision. 195 The statutes deny access to the courts for plaintiffs
with delayed manifestation diseases, thus denying these plaintiffs a remedy. The
184. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
186. Special Project, supra note 13, at 656-58.
187. Id. at 653.
188. Id. at 657.
189. Id. at 653.
190. Id. at 657. As a general proposition in any case, if evidence has deteriorated over time, this
problem is likely to be greater for the plaintiff, who has the burden of proof.
191. Id.
192. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 82.
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Barwick court stated that remedies are subject to due course of law, 196 and the
North Carolina Supreme Court has indicated that it will defer to the general
assembly regarding limitations on remedies.' 9 7 Nevertheless, the basis for with-
holding a remedy from those who are injured but do not know they are injured
is far from clear. When a statute prohibits a majority of those injured by a
particular type of product from bringing claims, the statute deprives an entire
class of plaintiffs of access to the courts. The fact that the discovery rule
adopted at the same time the statutes of repose were enacted makes it possible
for a larger class of plaintiffs to recover does not justify creating distinctions
between plaintiffs based upon the nature of their injuries rather than upon the
diligence with which they pursue relief. The concept that a constitutional right
may evaporate before it can be exercised lawfully is contrary to both the spirit
and the letter of the North Carolina Constitution. Other courts have found such
a result unconstitutional' 9" and the North Carolina Supreme Court should fol-
low their lead and adopt the reasoning of the North Carolina Court of Appeals
in Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 199 rather than continuing to avoid the issue
of the constitutionality of statutes of repose in the context of delayed manifesta-
tion diseases.
It is unclear whether the general assembly considered the disparate impact
of statutes of repose on plaintiffs with delayed manifestation diseases when it
enacted section 1-15(b) and the statutes replacing it.200 As the court in Tet-
terton20 1 discussed, the statute challenged in Wilder and Barwick, as well as the
current statutes, was passed in the 1970s as part of a nationwide trend. Else-
where passage of similar statutes appears to have been largely in response to
pressure from manufacturers and insurers.202 Manufacturers contended that
there was a products liability "crisis," as demonstrated by increasing insurance
196. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 958.
197. Lamb, 308 N.C. at 444, 302 S.E.2d at 882.
198. See supra notes 155-70 and accompanying text.
199. 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified, 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982);
see supra note 118; notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
200. Although N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) has been repealed, it was replaced by two similar
statutes. See supra note 23. One of these statutes, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6), has been applied to
bar several asbestosis claims. See Silver v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 81-16-CIV-2 (E.D.N.C.
March 16, 1984); Hyer v. Amatex Corp., No. A-C-81-289 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 1983), decision of
appeal pending sub nom. Hyer v. Pittsburg Coming Corp., No. 83-2117 (4th Cir.). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held this statute constitutional in Brown v.
General Elec. Co., 733 F.2d 1085 (4th Cir. 1984). In this products liability action based on an
allegedly defective fryer, the court held that the plaintiff's action was barred by § 1-50(6) and that
the statute does not violate various state and federal constitutional provisions. The North Carolina
Supreme Court discussed the decision in Brown with approval in Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 57, 332
S.E.2d at 75.
The period of repose specified in § 1-50(6) is only six years, so it is likely that it will bar a
greater number of claims than § 1-15(b). Shortly after the enactment of§ 1-15(b), one commentator
speculated as to whether the general assembly would be able to "resist the pressures of special inter-
ests to reduce the ten year limitation period." Lauerman, The Accrual and Limitation of Causes of
Actions for Nonapparent Bodily Harm and Physical Defects in Property in North Carolina, 8 WAKE
FORsr L. RIv. 327, 385 (1972).
201. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 55-56, 332 S.E.2d at 73-74.
202. See Dworkin, supra note 152, at 34; Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products
Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REV. 663, 663-64 (1978); Options Paper on Product
Liability and Accident Compensation Issues, 43 Fed. Reg. 40,438 (1978) (public commentary on
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premiums.20 3 One of the manufacturers' primary concerns was the "long tail,"
or liability for damage done by old products.2° 4 Statutes of repose limit manu-
facturers' liability for old products by setting a definite period of time after the
date of sale within which all claims must be brought, regardless of when the
product's harm occurred or was discovered. 205
The goal of the North Carolina General Assembly in enacting statutes of
repose mirrored that of other jurisdictions-a reduction in the potential liability
of products manufacturers. The statutes' disparate effect in delayed manifesta-
tion cases most likely was not considered.20 6 If, in fact, the impact of section 1-
15(b) and its replacements in delayed manifestation cases was not considered by
the general assembly, it should be considered now in light of Wilder.
Wilder provides relief from the harsh effect of statutes of repose for plain-
tiffs whose occupational diseases were diagnosed before October 1, 1979. Many
other disease victims still may be barred by the current statutes, however. The
effect of these statutes in the context of delayed manifestation diseases may be
unconstitutional, but the North Carolina Supreme Court does not appear willing
to hold such statutes unconstitutional. Past precedents may make such a hold-
ing difficult,20 7 and the court's approach in Wilder indicates that it is not anx-
ious to confront the issue of the statutes' constitutionality. The court should
address the statutes' constitutionality to resolve the uncertainty surrounding the
proposed Model Uniform Product Liability Act); see also Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 55-56, 332 SE.2d at
73-74 (detailing manufacturers' interest in establishing statutes of repose).
North Carolina's original statute was repealed in 1979 and replaced by similar statutes. See
supra note 23.
203. See Phillips, supra note 202, at 663; Note, When the Product Ticks: Products Liability and
Statutes of Limitations, 11 IND. L. REv. 693, 694-95 (1978).
It has been questioned whether such a crisis indeed existed. See, eg., Johnson, Products Liabil-
ity 'Reform':" A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.L. REv. 677, 678 (1978).
204. See McGovern, supra note 1, at 593.
205. Before enactment of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b), the statute of limitations began to run
from the date of injury rather than from the date of discovery of an injury. Assuming that injury
was defined as the date Barwick inhaled asbestos dust rather than when the asbestosis became appar-
ent, his claim probably would also have been barred prior to enactment of § 1-15(b).
In enacting § 1-15(b), the general assembly adopted the discovery rule, which generally extends
the time period within which products liability plaintiffs can bring actions. This development un-
doubtedly contributed to maiufacturers' pressure for a statute of repose to limit their potential
liability.
206. The court in Barwick believed otherwise. The court concluded that the general assembly
was aware of "latent type injuries" in enacting § 1-15(b). Barwick, 736 F.2d at 956. There is a
distinction, however, between latent injuries and delayed manifestation diseases. See supra notes
176-83 and accompanying text.
207. In holding an architectural statute of repose constitutional in Lamb v. Wedgewood S.
Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983), see supra notes 120-24, the North Carolina Supreme
Court showed considerable deference to the general assembly. Lamb, 308 N.C. at 433-35, 302
S.E.2d at 876-83. Similarly, in Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415
(1982), the court indicated in dicta that it probably would find the recently enacted six year statute
of repose for products liability actions, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (1983), constitutional. See supra
notes 131-35 and accompanying text. The court explained that the general assembly has the power
to create conditions precedent to common-law causes of action and then stated: "We believe the
legislature has created just such a condition precedent in G.S. 1-50(6)." Bolick, 306 N.C. at 371, 293
S.E.2d at 420. It seems likely, therefore, that should the North Carolina Supreme Court actually
address the constitutionality of statutes of repose as applied to delayed manifestation diseases, it
would be constrained by its own precedent to find such statutes constitutional.
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current statutes. The general assembly, however, need not wait for the court to
act. Wilder indicates that the public policy of the State is that plaintiffs with
delayed manifestation diseases should not be barred from bringing claims before
their diseases are diagnosed. The general assembly, therefore, should amend
sections 1-50(6) and 1-52(16) to exempt delayed manifestation disease claims
from the statutes' repose provisions.
20 8
Assuming the North Carolina Supreme Court does not hold statutes of re-
pose unconstitutional as applied to delayed manifestation diseases in the near
future, legislative action is the only remaining means of ensuring relief to plain-
tiffs whose claims are governed by the current statutes of repose. The Alabama
Legislature has provided that claims arising from exposure to asbestos accrue on
the date the injured party reasonably should have discovered the injury.20 9 The
statute is similar to North Carolina's in that it follows the discovery rule, but the
Alabama statute differs from North Carolina's in that it does not establish an
outer time limit within which the plaintiff must bring suit.
Legislatures in several other states with statutes similar to North Carolina's
have created exceptions for claims arising from exposure to asbestos. For exam-
ple, the Tennessee General Assembly amended its statute of repose to exempt
208. Because the application of such statutes to asbestosis and other delayed manifestation cases
leads to harsh results, plaintiffs whose claims are governed by §§ 1-52(16) and 1-50(6) are likely to
try challenges in addition to the constitutionality challenge as long as the court avoids the constitu-
tionality issue and the general assembly does not amend the statutes. For example, such plaintiffs
may argue that a statute of repose should be tolled in the case of fraud. Dworkin, supra note 152, at
51-52. Although delayed manifestation cases often are amenable to charges of fraudulent conceal-
ment by the defendant because of the time lag between discovery of the effect of the defendant's
product and the public's knowledge of the effect, id., clearly plaintiffs will not always be able to
prove fraud. The plaintiff in Wilder raised the fraudulent concealment argument, Appellant's Brief
at 8, but the court did not address this argument.
Delayed manifestation plaintiffs also might argue that a cause of action should not accrue until
discovery of an injury, even if the injury is discovered later than the outer limit imposed by the
statute. When the statute does not contain an outer limit, the discovery rule allows delayed manifes-
tation plaintiffs to recover. See, eg., infra note 209. A similar argument is that the defendant has a
continuing duty to warn, so the statutory period should not begin to run until the plaintiff receives
warning. This argument was unsuccessful in Barwick See Barwick, 736 F.2d at 963. Plaintiff in
Wilder raised the continuing duty to warn argument, Appellant's Brief at 18-20, but the court did
not address it. Both of these arguments are likely to be rejected because they effectively do away
with the outer limit imposed by the statutes. See Barwick, 736 F.2d at 963.
Finally, plaintiffs might attempt to persuade the courts to carve out an exception to the current
statutes for delayed manifestation diseases as the Wilder court did for § 1-15(b).
209. ALA. CODE § 6-2-30 (Supp. 1985) provides:
(a) All civil actions must be commenced after the cause of action has accrued within the
period prescribed in this article and not afterwards, unless otherwise specifically provided
for in this Code.
(b) A civil action for any injury to the person or rights of another resulting from exposure
to asbestos, including asbestos-containing products, shall be deemed to accrue on the first
date the injured party, through reasonable diligence, should have reason to discover the
injury giving rise to such civil action ....
By providing that the plaintiff's cause of action accrues upon discovery of his or her injury, the
absolute time bar is avoided, assuming there is no outer cap on the period of discovery. Some courts
follow this approach in determining when a cause of action accrues. See, eg., Locke v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981) (plaintiff's cause of action for mesothelioma
accrues when tumor develops or when lung function is impaired, not when plaintiff was last exposed
to asbestos). Other courts have rejected it. See, eg., Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527
(7th Cir. 1983) (cause of action accrues on last exposure to asbestos), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 2690
(1984).
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asbestos cases from the ten-year repose period, even though the statute was held
constitutional prior to the amendment.
2 10
The exception established in the Idaho statute of repose211 is more general,
stating that the ten-year period of repose does not apply if injury was caused by
prolonged exposure to a product if the defect in the product was not discovera-
ble until ten years after delivery, or if the harm did not manifest itself until ten
years after delivery. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act212 takes a simi-
lar approach.
Various policy reasons for treating delayed manifestation cases differently
from other personal injury cases suggest that the North Carolina General As-
sembly should adopt one of these approaches toward legislative reform. Unlike
other product-caused injuries, the diseases caused by exposure to asbestos gener-
ally take longer than six or ten years to develop.213 Under existing North Caro-
lina statutes, therefore, most causes of action for asbestosis and mesothelioma
will be barred before the victim even knows he or she has a disease. While it is
possible that this result "does not rise to constitutional dimensions, ' 214 it does
suggest that the rights of special interests, namely insurers and manufacturers,
are protected from liability for delayed manifestation diseases to an inordinate
degree. 215 Even in the absence of an absolute time limit to protect defendants,
plaintiffs still would be faced with the burden of proof, including proof of causa-
210. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980)
reads:
(a) Any action against a manufacturer or seller of a product for injury to person or prop-
erty caused by its defective or unreasonably dangerous condition must be brought within
the period fixed by §§ 28-3-104, 28-3-105, 28-3-202 and 47-2-725, but notwithstanding any
exceptions to these provisions it must be brought within six (6) years of the date of injury,
in any event, the action must be brought within ten (10) years from the date on which the
product was first purchased for use or consumption, or within one (1) year after the expira-
tion of the anticipated life of the product, whichever is the shorter, except in the case of
injury to minors whose action must be brought within a period of one (1) year after attain-
ing the age of majority, whichever occurs sooner.
(b) The foregoing limitation of actions shall not apply to any action resulting from exposure
to asbestos.
(emphasis added).
211. IDAHO CODE § [6-1403] 6-1303(2)(b)4 (Supp. 1985) provides:
The ten (10) year period of repose established in subsection (2)(a) hereof shall not apply if
the harm was caused by prolonged exposure to a defective product, or if the injury-causing
aspect of the product that existed at the time of delivery was not discoverable by an ordi-
nary reasonably prudent person until more than ten (10) years after the time of delivery, or
if the harm, caused within 10 years after the time of delivery, did not manifest itself until
after that time.
212. See MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILrrY Acr § 110(B)(2)(d), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714,
62,732 (1979). Section 1 10(B)(1) establishes a presumption that after 10 years, the useful safe life of
a product has expired. Section 110(B)(2)(d) provides:
The ten-(10-) year period of repose established in Subsection (B)(1) shall not apply if the
harm was caused by prolonged exposure to a defective product, or if the injury-causing
aspect of the product that existed at the time of delivery was not discoverable by an ordi-
nary reasonably prudent person until more than ten (10) years after the time of delivery, or
if the harm, caused within 10 (ten) years after the time of delivery, did not manifest itself
until after that time.
213. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
214. Phillips, supra note 202, at 673.
215. See Dworkin, supra note 152, at 43.
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tion and product identification; 21 6 the lapse of time between exposure to asbestos
and manifestation of the disease increases the difficulty of the plaintiff's task.
Thus, an exception in the statute for delayed manifestation diseases would not
tip the balance in favor of plaintiffs, but rather would create a more equitable
relationship between plaintiffs and defendants.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Wilder took an important first step
toward recognizing the inequity in barring plaintiffs from pursuing remedies
before they know they are injured. In holding that section 1-15(b) does not
apply to diseases, the court avoided the unfair result reached by the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Barwick. By resting its. decision on statutory rather than constitutional
analysis, however, the supreme court left open the question whether sections 1-
50(6) and 1-52(16), the statutes of repose currently in effect, apply to delayed
manifestation diseases. Perhaps the court would be unwilling in light of its
precedents 217 to hold these statutes unconstitutional, but it is clear that the Wil-
der court sought to avoid the application of this type of statute to delayed mani-
festation diseases. The result the court reached was equitable, but the problem
the statutes create was not resolved. The next step should be the general assem-
bly's-it should follow the example of other states and create an exception to the
repose provisions of sections 1-50(6) and 1-52(16) for delayed manifestation dis-
eases such as asbestosis. Under this approach, plaintiffs with delayed manifesta-
tion diseases would be required to bring claims within a certain period of time
after discovery of their disease, but without the current ten or six year limit.
Such a provision would remove the uncertainty surrounding the statutes after
Wilder and would equitably balance the interests of defendants and plaintiffs.
LESLIE CALKINS O'TOOLE
216. See Johnson, supra note 203, at 691; McGovern, supra note 1, at 590; Phillips, supra note
202, at 674.
217. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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